GHSA-phg3-3g28-wq9v
Hatchet - Unauthenticated OAuth state CSRF / login-CSRF via empty-state collision in ValidateOAuthState
Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet | < 0.91.1 | 0.91.1 |
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
### Summary
Hatchet version v0.86.26 and below is vulnerable to OAuth state CSRF (login CSRF / account fixation).
The vulnerable code clears the session `oauth_state_<integration>` value to the empty string `""` after a successful OAuth callback rather than removing the key, and the subsequent state-equality check then accepts an empty `?state=` parameter on any later callback request — allowing an unauthenticated attacker to bind an already-authenticated victim's session cookie to an attacker-controlled OAuth identity (account takeover via login-CSRF).
### Impact
Affected configurations: any deployment that has enabled at least one of `auth.google.enabled`, `auth.github.enabled`, or the Slack integration, and where the victim has completed at least one OAuth flow on that integration in the current session. Bug present on `main` HEAD and in every tagged release up to and including v0.86.26 (commit `243f41d9e1161e70d47dfc0a6509f1c4ddfc9c23`).
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.