GHSA-r4fj-r33x-8v88

#### Summary A GitHub Actions workflow uses untrusted user input from `issue_comment.body` directly inside a shell command, allowing potential command injection and arbitrary code execution on the runner. #### Details The workflow is triggered by `issue_comment`, which can be controlled by external users. In the following step: ```bash echo identifiers=$(echo "${{ github.event.comment.body }}" | grep -oE '@njzjz-bot .*' | head -n1 | cut -c12- | xargs) >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT ``` the value of `github.event.comment.body` is directly interpolated into a shell command inside `run:`. Since GitHub Actions evaluates `${{ }}` before execution, attacker-controlled input is injected into the shell context without sanitization. This creates a command injection risk. Additionally, the extracted value is later reused in another step that constructs output using backticks: ```bash echo '@${{ github.event.comment.user.login }} Here is the BibTeX entry for `${{ steps.extract-identifiers.outputs.identifiers }}`:' ``` which may further propagate unsafe content. #### PoC 1. Go to an issue in the repository 2. Post a comment such as: `@njzjz-bot paper123" ) ; whoami ; # ` 3. Observe whether the command is executed or reflected in logs/output <img width="658" height="203" alt="poc" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/084ac264-8cb9-4721-8279-26a1da9b891f" /> The injected payload successfully breaks out of the quoted context and executes arbitrary shell commands. As shown in the workflow logs, the injected `whoami` command is executed, and the output (`runner`) is printed. This confirms that attacker-controlled input from `github.event.comment.body` is interpreted as shell commands. This demonstrates a clear command injection vulnerability in the workflow. #### Impact * Remote attackers can inject arbitrary shell commands via issue comments * Potential impacts: * Execution of arbitrary commands in GitHub Actions runner * Access to `GITHUB_TOKEN` * Exfiltration of repository data * CI/CD pipeline compromise This issue affects all current versions of the repository as the vulnerable workflow is present in the main branch. ### Suggested Fix Avoid directly interpolating untrusted user input into shell commands. Instead, pass `github.event.comment.body` through an environment variable and reference it safely within the script: ```yaml - name: Extract identifiers id: extract-identifiers env: COMMENT_BODY: ${{ github.event.comment.body }} run: | identifiers=$(echo "$COMMENT_BODY" | grep -oE '@njzjz-bot .*' | head -n1 | cut -c12- | xargs) echo "identifiers=$identifiers" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT