GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r

## Summary `langchain-openai`'s `_url_to_size()` helper (used by `get_num_tokens_from_messages` for image token counting) validated URLs for SSRF protection and then fetched them in a separate network operation with independent DNS resolution. This left a TOCTOU / DNS rebinding window: an attacker-controlled hostname could resolve to a public IP during validation and then to a private/localhost IP during the actual fetch. The practical impact is limited because the fetched response body is passed directly to Pillow's `Image.open()` to extract dimensions — the response content is never returned, logged, or otherwise exposed to the caller. An attacker cannot exfiltrate data from internal services through this path. A potential risk is blind probing (inferring whether an internal host/port is open based on timing or error behavior). ## Affected versions - `langchain-openai` < 1.1.14 ## Patched versions - `langchain-openai` >= 1.1.14 (requires `langchain-core` >= 1.2.31) ## Affected code **File:** `libs/partners/openai/langchain_openai/chat_models/base.py` — `_url_to_size()` The vulnerable pattern was a validate-then-fetch with separate DNS resolution: ```python validate_safe_url(image_source, allow_private=False, allow_http=True) # ... separate network operation with independent DNS resolution ... response = httpx.get(image_source, timeout=timeout) ``` ## Fix The fix replaces the validate-then-fetch pattern with an SSRF-safe httpx transport (`SSRFSafeSyncTransport` from `langchain-core`) that: - Resolves DNS once and validates all returned IPs against a policy (private ranges, cloud metadata, localhost, k8s internal DNS) - Pins the connection to the validated IP, eliminating the DNS rebinding window - Disables redirect following to prevent redirect-based SSRF bypasses This fix was released in langchain-openai 1.1.14.