GHSA-rf6f-7fwh-wjgh
Prototype Pollution via parse() in NodeJS flatted
Packages
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
---
**Summary**
The parse() function in flatted can use attacker-controlled string values from the parsed JSON as direct array index
keys, without validating that they are numeric. Since the internal input buffer is a JavaScript Array, accessing it
with the key "\_\_proto\_\_" returns Array.prototype via the inherited getter. This object is then treated as a legitimate
parsed value and assigned as a property of the output object, effectively leaking a live reference to Array.prototype
to the consumer. Any code that subsequently writes to that property will pollute the global prototype.
---
**Root Cause**
File: esm/index.js:29 (identical in cjs/index.js)
```
const resolver = (input, lazy, parsed, $) => output => {
for (let ke = keys(output), {length} = ke, y = 0; y < length; y++) {
const k = ke[y];
const value = output[k];
if (value instanceof Primitive) {
const tmp = input[value]; // Bug is here
```
No validation that value is a safe numeric index input is built as a plain Array. JavaScript's property lookup on arrays traverses the prototype chain for non-numeric keys. The key "\_\_proto\_\_" resolves to Array.prototype, which:
- has type "object" → passes the typeof tmp === object guard at line 30
- is not in the parsed Set yet → passes the !parsed.has(tmp) guard.
- The reference to Array.prototype is then enqueued in lazy and later unconditionally assigned to the output object.
---
**Replication Steps**
```
const Flatted = require('flatted');
const parsed = Flatted.parse('[{"x":"__proto__"}]');
parsed.x.polluted = 'pwned';
console.log([].polluted); // Returns true
```
---
**Impact**
An attacker can supply a crafted flatted string to parse() that causes the returned object to hold a live reference to Array.prototype, enabling any downstream code that writes to that property to pollute the global prototype chain, potentially causing denial of service or code execution.
**Recommended solution**
Validate that the index string represents an integer within the bounds of input before accessing it:
// Before (vulnerable)
const tmp = input[value];
// After (safe)
const idx = +value; // coerce boxed String → number
const tmp = (Number.isInteger(idx) && idx >= 0 && idx < input.length)
? input[idx]
: undefined;
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.
- https://github.com/WebReflection/flatted/security/advisories/GHSA-rf6f-7fwh-wjgh
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33228
- https://github.com/WebReflection/flatted/commit/885ddcc33cf9657caf38c57c7be45ae1c5272802
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:13826
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:34342
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:9742
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-33228
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2449872
- https://github.com/WebReflection/flatted
- https://github.com/WebReflection/flatted/releases/tag/v3.4.2