GHSA-rq77-p4h8-4crw
gorilla/csrf CSRF vulnerability due to broken Referer validation
Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/gorilla/csrf | < 1.7.3 | 1.7.3 |
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
### Summary
gorilla/csrf is vulnerable to CSRF via form submission from origins that share a top level domain with the target origin.
### Details
gorilla/csrf does not validate the Origin header against an allowlist. Its executes its validation of the Referer header for cross-origin requests only when it believes the request is being served over TLS. It determines this by inspecting the `r.URL.Scheme` value. However, this value is never populated for "server" requests [per the Go spec](https://pkg.go.dev/net/http#Request), and so this check does not run in practice.
```
// URL specifies either the URI being requested (for server
// requests) or the URL to access (for client requests).
//
// For server requests, the URL is parsed from the URI
// supplied on the Request-Line as stored in RequestURI. For
// most requests, fields other than Path and RawQuery will be
// empty. (See [RFC 7230, Section 5.3](https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7230.html#section-5.3))
//
// For client requests, the URL's Host specifies the server to
// connect to, while the Request's Host field optionally
// specifies the Host header value to send in the HTTP
// request.
URL *[url](https://pkg.go.dev/net/url).[URL](https://pkg.go.dev/net/url#URL)
```
### PoC
- create trusted origin `target.example.test` protected with gorilla/csrf and served over TLS hosting form on `/submit`
- create attacker origin `attack.example.test` served over TLS
- attacker exfiltrates token & cookie combination from `target.example.test`
- attacker sets exfiltrated cookie with `domain=.example.test and path=/submit`
- as the cookie has a more specific path than `/` (the default for CSRF cookies) it will be sent first by the browser on submit to our target origin
- submit form from `attack.example.test` with exfiltrated CSRF form token
- observe valid form submission as `attack.example.test` Origin / Referer headers are not validated.
### Impact
This vulnerability allows an attacker who has gained XSS on a subdomain or top level domain to perform authenticated form submissions against gorilla/csrf protected targets that share the same top level domain.
This bug has existed in gorilla/csrf since its initial release in 2015.
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.
- https://github.com/gorilla/csrf/security/advisories/GHSA-rq77-p4h8-4crw
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-24358
- https://github.com/gorilla/csrf/commit/9dd6af1f6d30fc79fb0d972394deebdabad6b5eb
- https://github.com/gorilla/csrf
- https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/05/msg00002.html
- https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3607