GHSA-rrqh-93c8-j966
Ruby SAML DOS vulnerability with large SAML response
Packages
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
### Summary
A denial-of-service vulnerability exists in ruby-saml even with the message_max_bytesize setting configured. The vulnerability occurs because the SAML response is validated for Base64 format prior to checking the message size, leading to potential resource exhaustion.
### Details
`ruby-saml` includes a `message_max_bytesize` setting intended to prevent DOS attacks and decompression bombs. However, this protection is ineffective in some cases due to the order of operations in the code:
https://github.com/SAML-Toolkits/ruby-saml/blob/fbbedc978300deb9355a8e505849666974ef2e67/lib/onelogin/ruby-saml/saml_message.rb
```ruby
def decode_raw_saml(saml, settings = nil)
return saml unless base64_encoded?(saml) # <--- Issue here. Should be moved after next code block.
settings = OneLogin::RubySaml::Settings.new if settings.nil?
if saml.bytesize > settings.message_max_bytesize
raise ValidationError.new("Encoded SAML Message exceeds " + settings.message_max_bytesize.to_s + " bytes, so was rejected")
end
decoded = decode(saml)
...
end
```
The vulnerability is in the execution order. Prior to checking bytesize the `base64_encoded?` function performs regex matching on the entire input string:
```ruby
!!string.gsub(/[\r\n]|\\r|\\n|\s/, "").match(BASE64_FORMAT)
```
### Impact
_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_
When successfully exploited, this vulnerability can lead to:
- Excessive memory consumption
- High CPU utilization
- Application slowdown or unresponsiveness
- Complete application crash in severe cases
- Potential denial of service for legitimate users
All applications using `ruby-saml` with SAML configured and enabled are vulnerable.
### Potential Solution
Reorder the validation steps to ensure max bytesize is checked first
```ruby
def decode_raw_saml(saml, settings = nil)
settings = OneLogin::RubySaml::Settings.new if settings.nil?
if saml.bytesize > settings.message_max_bytesize
raise ValidationError.new("Encoded SAML Message exceeds " + settings.message_max_bytesize.to_s + " bytes, so was rejected")
end
return saml unless base64_encoded?(saml)
decoded = decode(saml)
...
end
```
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.
- https://github.com/SAML-Toolkits/ruby-saml/security/advisories/GHSA-rrqh-93c8-j966
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54572
- https://github.com/SAML-Toolkits/ruby-saml/pull/770
- https://github.com/SAML-Toolkits/ruby-saml/commit/38ef5dd1ce17514e202431f569c4f5633e6c2709
- https://github.com/SAML-Toolkits/ruby-saml
- https://github.com/SAML-Toolkits/ruby-saml/releases/tag/v1.18.1
- https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/ruby-saml/CVE-2025-54572.yml
- https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/09/msg00001.html