GHSA-vfx2-hv2g-xj5f
Protocol-Relative URL Injection via Single Backslash Bypass in Angular SSR
Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | @angular/ssr | >= 22.0.0-next.0, < 22.0.0-next.2 | 22.0.0-next.2 |
| npm | @angular/ssr | >= 21.0.0-next.0, < 21.2.3 | 21.2.3 |
| npm | @angular/ssr | >= 20.0.0-next.0, < 20.3.21 | 20.3.21 |
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in `@angular/ssr` due to an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27738. While the original fix successfully blocked multiple leading slashes (e.g., `///`), the internal validation logic fails to account for a single backslash (`\`) bypass.
When an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header:
- An attacker provides a value starting with a single backslash (e.g., `\evil.com`).
- The internal validation failed to flag the single backslash as invalid.
- The application prepends a leading forward slash, resulting in a `Location` header containing `/\evil.com`.
- Modern browsers interpret the `/\` sequence as `//`, treating it as a protocol-relative URL and redirecting the user to the attacker-controlled domain.
Furthermore, the response lacks the `Vary: X-Forwarded-Prefix` header, allowing the malicious redirect to be stored in intermediate caches (Web Cache Poisoning).
### Impact
This vulnerability allows attackers to conduct large-scale phishing and SEO hijacking:
- **Scale**: A single request can poison a high-traffic route, impacting all users until the cache expires.
- **SEO Poisoning**: Search engine crawlers may follow and index these malicious redirects, causing the legitimate site to be delisted or associated with malicious domains.
- **Trust**: Because the initial URL belongs to the trusted domain, users and security tools are less likely to flag the redirect as malicious.
### Patches
- 22.0.0-next.2
- 21.2.3
- 20.3.21
### Workarounds
Until the patch is applied, developers should sanitize the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header in their `server.ts` before the Angular engine processes the request:
```ts
app.use((req, res, next) => {
const prefix = req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'];
if (typeof prefix === 'string') {
// Sanitize by removing all leading forward and backward slashes
req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'] = prefix.trim().replace(/^[/\\]+/, '/');
}
next();
});
```
### References
- Fix: https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/pull/32771
- Original CVE: CVE-2026-27738
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.