GHSA-vhjm-w67q-g75c

### Impact When `@hapi/wreck` follows a 3xx redirect to a different hostname, only the `Authorization` and `Cookie` headers are stripped. The standard credential header `Proxy-Authorization` is forwarded intact to the redirect target, potentially exposing forward-proxy credentials to a host outside the original trust boundary. Redirect following is opt-in. The redirects option defaults to false (no redirections followed), so applications are only affected if they have explicitly set redirects to a positive integer on the request or via `Wreck.defaults({ redirects: ... })`. ### Patches `@hapi/wreck` 18.1.1 extends the cross-hostname strip set to include `proxy-authorization`. Upgrade to 18.1.1 or later. ### Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible: - Leave redirects at its default (`false`) — applications that never enable redirect following are not affected. - If redirects are required, set redirects: 0 when calling endpoints with sensitive headers, or strip Proxy-Authorization from the headers before issuing the request. - Use the `beforeRedirect` hook to manually strip proxy-authorization (and any other sensitive application headers) when `redirectOptions` targets a different hostname than the original request. ### Resources - Related: [CVE-2024-30260 / GHSA-3787-6prv-h9w3 ](https://github.com/nodejs/undici/security/advisories/GHSA-3787-6prv-h9w3)(undici) - [RFC 7235 §4.4 — Proxy-Authorization](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7235#section-4.4)