GHSA-w235-x559-36mg

## Summary A configuration injection issue in the Docker tool sandbox could allow dangerous Docker options (bind mounts, host networking, unconfined profiles) to be applied, enabling container escape or host data access. ## Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected versions: `<= 2026.2.14` - Fixed version: `>= 2026.2.15` (next release) ## Impact If an attacker can influence sandbox Docker configuration (or an operator pastes untrusted config), they may be able to: - mount sensitive host paths (e.g. `/etc`, `/proc`, `/sys`, `/dev`, Docker socket) - use `network=host` to bypass container network isolation - use `seccompProfile=unconfined` / `apparmorProfile=unconfined` to weaken isolation This can lead to host secret exfiltration or full host control (via Docker socket exposure). ## Fix OpenClaw now blocks dangerous sandbox Docker settings: - runtime enforcement when building `docker create` args - config-schema validation for `network=host`, `seccompProfile=unconfined`, `apparmorProfile=unconfined` - security audit findings to surface dangerous sandbox docker config ## Workarounds - Do not configure `agents.*.sandbox.docker.binds` to mount system directories or Docker socket paths. - Keep `agents.*.sandbox.docker.network` at `none` (default) or `bridge`. - Do not use `unconfined` for seccomp/AppArmor profiles. ## Fix Commit(s) - 887b209db47f1f9322fead241a1c0b043fd38339 - 1b6704ef5800152c777ea52b77aa2c8a46c13705 (docs) ## Release Process Note This advisory is pre-populated with the planned fixed version (`>= 2026.2.15`). Once `[email protected]` is published to npm, publishing this advisory should be a single-click action. Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.