GHSA-w342-mj6g-v9c4

### Summary A connected peer can send a compressed `RequestDataType_HashArrayType` direct request that is only `442` bytes on the wire but expands into `200000` decoded hash entries inside the resolver path. On `klever-go` `v1.7.17`, this allows remote memory and CPU amplification against nodes that accept P2P peer connections. ### Details Resolver antiflood logic accounts only one logical message and the compressed wire size in `data/retriever/resolvers/messageProcessor.go#L30`. `Batch.Decompress()` in `data/batch/batch.go#L122` enforces an inflated byte cap but does not enforce a decoded repeated-field item cap. After decompression, `TxResolver` preallocates and iterates all decoded hashes in `data/retriever/resolvers/transactionResolver.go#L194`, and `TrieNodeResolver` iterates the same unchecked decoded set in `data/retriever/resolvers/trieNodeResolver.go#L108`. Pinned references: - https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/333f6ec910906e227705fc5767dc897d8fbfc862/data/retriever/resolvers/messageProcessor.go#L30 - https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/333f6ec910906e227705fc5767dc897d8fbfc862/data/batch/batch.go#L122 - https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/333f6ec910906e227705fc5767dc897d8fbfc862/data/retriever/resolvers/transactionResolver.go#L194 - https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/333f6ec910906e227705fc5767dc897d8fbfc862/data/retriever/resolvers/trieNodeResolver.go#L108 This appears distinct from the public `CVE-2026-44697` / `GHSA-87m7-qffr-542v`, which covered `MultiDataInterceptor` compressed batch fan-in. This report concerns resolver request paths that remain reachable through real libp2p direct-send plumbing on `v1.7.17`. ### PoC Reproduced with: ```bash go run auditpoc/request_batch_hash_amplification_poc.go go test github.com/klever-io/klever-go/auditpoc -run TestRequestBatchHashAmplification_DirectSendReachability -count=1 ``` Observed output: ```text request wire bytes: 442 fits direct-send limit (983040 bytes): true tx resolver lookups: 200000 trie resolver lookups: 200000 heap delta before first tx lookup: 17.47 MiB ok github.com/klever-io/klever-go/auditpoc ``` The E2E harness registers the victim resolver on the request topic and sends the malicious payload through `SendToConnectedPeer()` to prove the work amplification survives the real direct-send path. ### Impact A connected peer can convert a sub-kilobyte request into large decode-time memory pressure and synchronous CPU work on the target node. Repeated requests or several concurrent peers can degrade or exhaust validator resources, affecting node availability.