GHSA-w43h-r5m5-p832
NocoDB: Server-Side Request Forgery via Database Connection Host
Packages
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
### Summary
The connection-test endpoint opened a raw TCP socket to the user-supplied database
host without resolving and range-checking the destination, so private and link-local
addresses (including IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms and `localhost`) reached the driver.
### Details
A new `validateDbConnectionHost` helper resolves hostnames through DNS, parses each
address with `ipaddr.js`, normalises IPv4-mapped IPv6, and rejects addresses in the
private, loopback, link-local, unique-local, reserved, unspecified, broadcast, and
carrier-grade-NAT ranges. `0.0.0.0`, `::`, and the literal `localhost` are special-cased.
The check runs before the existing SSL block in the connection-test controller and
gates the driver invocation.
### Impact
Authenticated users with connection-test permission could probe internal services
(Redis, the cloud metadata endpoint, internal databases) reachable from the NocoDB
process. A DNS rebinding attacker could still race the resolve-vs-connect window.
### Credit
This issue was reported by [@helwor-01](https://github.com/helwor-01).
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.