GHSA-w7x5-g22v-xqhr
Eclipse Jetty: Path parameter traversal
Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maven | org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-util | >= 12.0.0, < 12.0.35 | 12.0.35 |
| Maven | org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-util | >= 12.1.0, < 12.1.9 | 12.1.9 |
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
### Description (as reported)
#### Summary
In Jetty 12.1.8, org.eclipse.jetty.util.URIUtil.canonicalPath() may leave dot-dot path segments unnormalized when a semicolon path parameter marker is followed by a slash and a dot
segment.
A minimal example is:
`/public;/../admin/secret`
In my local reproduction, URIUtil.canonicalPath() returns:
`/public/../admin/secret`
instead of the expected normalized path:
`/admin/secret`
When Jetty's `SecurityHandler.PathMapped` is used to protect a path prefix such as `/admin/*`, the non-normalized canonical path may not match the protected prefix. As a result, an unauthenticated request may bypass the configured path-based security constraint.
#### Tested Version
Jetty: 12.1.8
JDK: 17.0.18
Maven: 3.9.14
Maven artifacts used:
org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server:12.1.8
org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-security:12.1.8
org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-session:12.1.8
Only confirmed Jetty 12.1.8 so far.
#### Minimal Reproduction
Starts a minimal Jetty server with the following security setup:
```java
SecurityHandler.PathMapped security = new SecurityHandler.PathMapped();
security.put("/admin/*", Constraint.from("admin"));
security.put("/*", Constraint.ALLOWED);
security.setAuthenticator(new BasicAuthenticator());
```
The test then sends requests with no `Authorization` header.
Observed result:
```
GET /admin/secret -> 401
GET /public;x/../admin/secret -> 200
```
The handler receives paths such as:
`/public/../admin/secret`
This suggests that the `/admin/*` security constraint is bypassed because `PathMapped` matching is performed against the non-normalized canonical path.
#### Suspected Root Cause
The suspected root cause is in `URIUtil.canonicalPath()`.
The relevant logic is approximately:
```java
for (int i = 0; i < end; i++)
{
char c = encodedPath.charAt(i);
switch (c)
{
case ';':
if (builder == null)
{
builder = new Utf8StringBuilder(encodedPath.length());
builder.append(encodedPath, 0, i);
}
while (++i < end)
{
if (encodedPath.charAt(i) == '/')
{
builder.append('/');
break;
}
}
break;
case '.':
if (slash)
normal = false;
if (builder != null)
builder.append(c);
break;
}
slash = c == '/';
}
String canonical = (builder != null)
? (onBadUtf8 == null ? builder.toCompleteString() : builder.takeCompleteString(onBadUtf8))
: encodedPath;
return normal ? canonical : normalizePath(canonical);
```
For the input:
`/public;/../admin/secret`
when the outer loop reaches the semicolon:
```
i = 7
c = ';'
slash = false
normal = true
```
Inside `case ';'`, the `while (++i < end)` loop advances i to the next character, which is already '/' for the empty path parameter form ";/".
The code then appends '/' to the canonical builder:
`builder.append('/');`
At this point, the canonical builder ends with '/':
`/public/`
However, the local variable `c` is still the old value ';', because `c` was read before entering the switch and is not updated when the inner loop advances `i`.
After leaving the switch, the loop updates the slash state using:
`slash = c == '/';`
Since `c` is still ';', slash becomes `false`.
On the next iteration, the scanner reaches '.', which is the first dot in the following "../" segment. Because slash is incorrectly `false`, this code does not run:
```java
if (slash)
normal = false;
```
Therefore `normal` remains `true`, and `canonicalPath()` returns the canonical string directly instead of calling `normalizePath(canonical)`.
The result is:
`/public/../admin/secret`
instead of:
`/admin/secret`
In short:
`case ';'` advances the scan position i and appends '/' to the canonical builder, but the loop tail still updates slash from the stale character `c=';'`. As a result, the following dot-dot segment is not detected as a path traversal segment.
#### More Precise Trigger Condition
The issue is not limited to a non-empty path parameter such as ";x".
The more precise trigger shape is:
`;[^/]*/.`
Examples:
```
/public;/../admin/secret
/public;x/../admin/secret
/public;anything/../admin/secret
/public;/./admin/secret
```
The minimal form is:
`/public;/../admin/secret`
because the semicolon is immediately followed by '/', so the inner while loop reaches '/' on its first increment.
#### Potential Minimal Fix Direction
A minimal fix would be to ensure that, when case ';' consumes input until '/' and appends '/' to the canonical builder, the slash state reflects the last effective character in the canonical path.
For example, conceptually:
```java
case ';':
if (builder == null)
{
builder = new Utf8StringBuilder(encodedPath.length());
builder.append(encodedPath, 0, i);
}
while (++i < end)
{
if (encodedPath.charAt(i) == '/')
{
builder.append('/');
slash = true;
break;
}
}
continue;
```
The important part is to avoid the loop tail from overwriting slash using the stale `c` value:
`slash = c == '/';`
In other words, `slash` should represent the last effective character appended to the canonical builder, not the original input character read before case ';' advanced `i`.
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.
- https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/security/advisories/GHSA-w7x5-g22v-xqhr
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8384
- https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/pull/14969
- https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/pull/14973
- https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/commit/82969c77f6da46e27008b10b3c14840cd31db084
- https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/commit/ade27ce93a37c33278720250d85c48601230ae3f
- https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project
- https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/releases/tag/jetty-12.0.35
- https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/releases/tag/jetty-12.1.9
- https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/cve-assignment/-/work_items/108