GHSA-whrj-4476-wvmp
Stored XSS in Rack::Directory via javascript: filenames rendered into anchor href
Packages
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
## Summary
`Rack::Directory` generates an HTML directory index where each file entry is rendered as a clickable link. If a file exists on disk whose basename begins with the `javascript:` scheme (e.g. `javascript:alert(1)`), the generated index includes an anchor whose `href` attribute is exactly `javascript:alert(1)`. Clicking this entry executes arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the hosting application.
This results in a client-side XSS condition in directory listings generated by `Rack::Directory`.
## Details
`Rack::Directory` renders directory entries using an HTML row template similar to:
```html
<a href='%s'>%s</a>
```
The `%s` placeholder is populated directly with the file’s basename. If the basename begins with `javascript:`, the resulting HTML contains an executable JavaScript URL:
```html
<a href='javascript:alert(1)'>javascript:alert(1)</a>
```
Because the value is inserted directly into the `href` attribute without scheme validation or normalization, browsers interpret it as a JavaScript URI. When a user clicks the link, the JavaScript executes in the origin of the Rack application.
## Impact
If `Rack::Directory` is used to expose filesystem contents over HTTP, an attacker who can create or upload files within that directory may introduce a malicious filename beginning with `javascript:`.
When a user visits the directory listing and clicks the entry, arbitrary JavaScript executes in the application's origin. Exploitation requires user interaction (clicking the malicious entry).
## Mitigation
* Update to a patched version of Rack in which `Rack::Directory` prefixes generated anchors with a relative path indicator (e.g. `./filename`).
* Avoid exposing user-controlled directories via `Rack::Directory`.
* Apply a strict Content Security Policy (CSP) to reduce impact of potential client-side execution issues.
* Where feasible, restrict or sanitize uploaded filenames to disallow dangerous URI scheme prefixes.
HackerOne profile:
https://hackerone.com/thesmartshadow
GitHub account owner:
Ali Firas (@thesmartshadow)
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.
- https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories/GHSA-whrj-4476-wvmp
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25500
- https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/f2f225f297b99fbee3d9f51255d41f601fc40aff
- https://github.com/rack/rack
- https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/rack/CVE-2026-25500.yml