GHSA-x9fj-57fh-c8wq

### Summary When dynamic text is interpolated into a `<script>` or `<style>` tag the Marko runtime failed to prevent tag breakout when the closing tag used non-lowercase casing. An attacker able to place input inside a `<script>` or `<style>` block could break out of the tag with `</SCRIPT>`, `</Style>`, etc. and inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript, resulting in cross-site scripting. ### Details The affected helpers used case-sensitive regular expressions to detect attempts at closing the surrounding tag: ```js // packages/runtime-tags/src/html/content.ts const unsafeScriptReg = /<\/script/g; const unsafeStyleReg = /<\/style/g; // packages/runtime-class/src/runtime/html/helpers/escape-script-placeholder.js const unsafeCharsReg = /<\/script/g; // packages/runtime-class/src/runtime/html/helpers/escape-style-placeholder.js const unsafeCharsReg = /<\/style/g; ``` HTML tag names are case-insensitive in the browser parser, so inputs such as `</SCRIPT>`, `</Script>`, or `</sTyLe>` were not matched by these regexes and passed through the helpers unchanged. A browser rendering the output treats the mixed-case end tag as a valid closing tag, terminating the script or style context, and then parses anything that follows as HTML. The Marko compiler routes interpolated values inside `<script>` and `<style>` tags through these helpers automatically (see `native-tag.ts:1080-1085`), so application code following the framework's conventions had no way to detect or compensate for the gap. ### PoC ```marko $ const userCode = "</SCRIPT><script>alert(1)//"; <script> const data = ${JSON.stringify(userCode)}; </script> ``` Would yield the following: ```html <script>const data = "</SCRIPT><script>alert(1)//";</script> ``` Which is then parsed in any WHATWG-compliant browser as: ```html <script>const data = "</script> <script>alert(1)//";</script> ``` ### Impact Cross-site scripting. Any Marko template that explicitly interpolates untrusted data inside a `<script>` or `<style>` block is affected. Stored XSS is trivial if the value originates from any persisted user input (username, profile bio, comment body, etc.) that is later embedded in a script tag during rendering. Exploitation yields arbitrary JavaScript execution in the victim's browser, enabling session token theft, account takeover, and arbitrary actions as the victim. Since the internal `_escape_script` and `_escape_style` helpers are the framework's designated defense against script/style tag breakout, applications following standard Marko patterns had no obvious reason to add a second layer of sanitization. This does not affect scripts or hydration state serialized by Marko itself — only templates that explicitly interpolate untrusted values inside a <script> or <style> tag. ### Patch Commit `19d4b37d0` — `fix: html script, style, and comment escaping`. ```diff - const unsafeScriptReg = /<\/script/g; + const unsafeScriptReg = /<\/script/gi; - const unsafeStyleReg = /<\/style/g; + const unsafeStyleReg = /<\/style/gi; ``` The same commit also introduced an `_escape_comment` helper and corresponding `escape-comment-placeholder.js`, hardening HTML comment escaping as a related preventative fix. Test fixtures were added under `escape-script-case`, `escape-style-case`, and `escape-comment`. ### Workarounds Upgrade to the patched release. As a short-term mitigation on affected versions, pre-sanitize any untrusted data before it reaches a template position rendered inside a `<script>` or `<style>` tag — e.g. normalize `</script`, `</style`, and their mixed-case variants before interpolation, or avoid direct interpolation of untrusted values inside these tags entirely.