GHSA-xwqr-rcqg-22mr

### Summary `SimplePdo::insert()`, `SimplePdo::update()`, and `SimplePdo::delete()` build SQL statements by concatenating the `$table` argument and the **keys** of the `$data` array directly into the query, with no identifier quoting and no validation. When an application forwards user-controlled data shapes to these helpers — a common and documented pattern, e.g. `$db->insert('users', $request->data->getData())` — an attacker can inject arbitrary SQL by crafting malicious array keys. ### Affected code `flight/database/SimplePdo.php`: ```php // insert (≈ 320-373) $sql = sprintf( "INSERT INTO %s (%s) VALUES (%s)", $table, // raw concat implode(', ', $columns), // raw array_keys($data) implode(', ', $placeholders) ); // update (≈ 397-409) $sets[] = "$column = ?"; // $column = user-controlled key $sql = sprintf( "UPDATE %s SET %s WHERE %s", $table, // raw implode(', ', $sets), $where ); // delete (≈ 427-429) $sql = "DELETE FROM $table WHERE $where"; ``` No identifier-quoting helper exists; neither `$table` nor the data keys are validated against a safe-identifier pattern. ### Proof of concept A controller does: ```php $db->insert('users', $request->data->getData()); ``` The attacker sends the JSON body: ```json {"name, is_admin) VALUES (?, 1);-- ": "attacker_injected"} ``` Generated SQL: ```sql INSERT INTO users (name, is_admin) VALUES (?, 1);-- ) VALUES (?) ``` After the `--` comment, the effective statement `INSERT INTO users (name, is_admin) VALUES (?, 1)` binds the single placeholder `'attacker_injected'`, yielding a row with `is_admin = 1`. Reproduced live on an in-memory sqlite database (`testproj/sqli_live2.php`): ``` id=1 name=alice is_admin=0 id=2 name=attacker_injected is_admin=1 <-- injected insert ``` `UPDATE` injection via the `$where` parameter was also reproduced: `$db->update('users', ['is_admin' => 1], "id = 1 OR 1=1")` flips admin on every row. ### Impact - **Privilege escalation** on any signup / register endpoint that forwards request data to `insert()` (attacker creates an administrative account in a single request). - Arbitrary column write through `update()` keys. - Data destruction and exfiltration through the `$where` parameter (`DELETE FROM users WHERE 1=1`, UNION-based exfil, etc.). ### Patch (fixed in `3.18.1`, commit `b8dd23a`) A new `requireSafeIdentifier()` helper validates table names and column names against `^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$` before they are interpolated into the SQL string. The `$where` parameter remains raw SQL as documented — parameterized values passed alongside it continue to be bound safely. ### Credit Discovered by **@Rootingg**.